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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of the abnormal pay dispersion on earnings management. Prior studies find that pay 
dispersion among top executives affect firm performance and executive turnover. We expect that abnormal pay 
dispersion among top executives affects financial reporting practice as well as firm performance and turnover and 
provide evidence of positive association between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management. This result 
suggests that executives are more likely to be engaged in earnings management to increase their compensation 
when they feel unfairness from the relative level of compensation. This finding helps financial statement users 
interpret firm performance and anticipate future outcomes by implying that additional managerial incentives for 
financial reporting are derived from internal pay dispersion. Our finding that abnormal pay dispersion leads to 
higher agency costs should also be of interest to shareholders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
here exist anecdotal examples to illustrate the importance of pay dispersion. J.P. Morgan is reputed, 
for example, to have been unwilling to invest in a company whose CEO was paid more than 50 
percent above the executive at the next level (Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006). Further, Ed Woolard, 
former CEO and Chair of Dupont and current Chair of the NYSE’s compensation committee, planned to impose a 
limit on CEO pay at 1.5 times the pay rate for the executive vice president (Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006). Peter 
Drucker also stated that “one characteristic of poorly performing organization is that top executives are paid more 
than 130 percent of the compensation of people at the next echelon” (Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006).  
 
Several researchers have also shown that executive pay dispersion have influences on managerial decision makings.1 
However, one of the issues with prior studies is that the behavioral consequences of dispersion examined in the 
literature are fairly narrow, primarily encompassing firm performance and executive turnover. We expect pay 
dispersion to influence financial reporting practice in addition to firm performance and executive turnover. The 
degree of satisfaction with the relative level of compensation affects managerial behavior. When executives derive 
disutility from the relative level of compensation, they may engage in opportunistic behavior to increase their 
compensation.2  For example, if their compensation depends on financial firm performance, managers could increase 
compensation via discretion in financial reporting. In this study, we investigate the impact of abnormal pay 
dispersion on earnings management, since deviation from normal levels of dispersion may provide executives with 
incentive for opportunistic behavior.  
 
We find that abnormal pay dispersion is positively associated with earnings management. This indicates that 
executives are more likely to be engaged in earnings management when pay dispersion is deviated from normal 
level of pay dispersion. The empirical results of this study provide valuable information to investors, regulators and 
                                                
1 See section 2 for more detailed review. 
2 Prospect theory, which was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), suggests that the value function is not symmetric between losses and 
gains from the reference point.  Instead, it says that slope is steeper for losses than for gains. This means that people have more disutility than 
utility from same amount of losses versus gains.  When an executive regards his total compensation relative to his expectation as a loss, the 
executive is more likely to reduce his disutility with opportunistic behavior.   
T 
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auditors. Understanding managerial incentives for financial reporting derived from internal pay dispersion helps 
financial statement users interpret firm performance and anticipate future outcomes. A finding that abnormal pay 
dispersion leads to higher agency costs should also be of interest to shareholders. In addition, setting up normal 
dispersion level that motivates competition among executives with a minimized adverse effect can mitigate potential 
agency costs. 
 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several aspects. First, this paper broadens the compensation 
literature by exploring the effect of pay dispersion on financial reporting practice as well as firm performance and 
executive turnover. Second, our results suggest that, in addition to compensation structure, internal compensation 
dispersion is a factor to be considered in structuring executive compensation. Finally, we provide evidence that pay 
dispersion affects both the level of accounting earnings and mechanisms used to reach those numbers. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and discusses the research design. Section 4 provides our empirical 
results and robustness tests.  Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOHTESES DEVELOPEMENT 
 
2.1 Pay Dispersion and Corporate Performance 
 
Two theories explain the effect of compensation dispersion on managerial behavior. First, tournament theory regards 
the advancement of executives in the firm hierarchy as a tournament in which they compete for promotion and 
higher compensation (Lee et al., 2008). According to this theory, an executive with high performance obtains 
promotion and receives prize, which is higher compensation. This motivates low-level executives to win the 
competition and exert more efforts (Byun, 2014). Thus, large pay dispersion among corporate hierarchies (i.e., 
higher compensation at the top level) provides managers with strong incentives to win the tournament and leads to 
higher efforts (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lee et al., 2008).  
 
While arguments for equity fairness theory suggest that high pay dispersion increases envy and dysfunctional 
behavior among employees and encourages rent-seeking activities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Levine, 1991; Lee 
et al., 2008). Cowherd and Levien (1992) and Duetsch (1985) argue that cooperation and cohesiveness among the 
members decrease when lower level workers recognize that they receive less than they deserve. In other words, low 
pay dispersion reduces conflicts and improves cohesiveness between organization members (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1988; Levine, 1991).  
 
Based on the two theories, various empirical studies have investigated how pay dispersion affects firm performance 
and show mixed empirical results. Main et al. (1993) report a positive relation between pay dispersion among top 
executive team members and corporate performance. Lee et al. (2008) also examine the effect of compensation 
dispersion on firm performance. They find that corporate performance is positively associated with the 
compensation dispersion. These results are consistent with tournament theory.  
 
However, Cowherd and Levine (1992) find that small pay differential between lower-level employees and upper-
echelon managers leads to high business-unit product quality. Employing a large sample of university and college 
faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) report that wage inequality within academic departments has a negative impact 
on faculty members’ satisfaction, research productivity, and research collaboration. Bloom (1999) also finds that pay 
dispersion is negatively associated with individual and organizational performance. These findings are consistent 
with pay equity theory that large pay dispersion decreases firm performance.  
 
Differently from prior literatures, Byun (2014) assumes that tournament theory and pay equity theory are not 
mutually exclusive. In addition, he suggests that there is an equilibrium level of pay dispersion, which trades off the 
motivation to perform (tournament theory) against induced conflict (pay equity theory). Based on this assumption, 
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he shows that deviation from the normal level of pay dispersion (hereafter abnormal pay dispersion) is negatively 
associated with corporate performance.3  
 
2.2 Pay Dispersion and Executive Turnover 
 
 Prior studies regarding pay dispersion examine the effect of pay dispersion on executive turnover. Bloom and 
Michel (2002) show that pay dispersion within an organization decreases the tenure of managers and increases the 
likelihood of leaving their organization. Messersmith et al. (2011) also find that pay dispersion is positively 
associated with the likelihood of executive turnover. While these two studies reveal that executive turnover 
increases when overall pay dispersion is high, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992) investigate the joint effect of pay 
dispersion in an organization and individual’s location in that distribution on turnover using a sample of 
administrators in college and university. They find that pay dispersion negatively affects the turnover of 
administrators with relatively high pay, but it positively related to the turnover of administrators with relatively low 
pay.  
 
Byun (2014) examines the relation between abnormal pay dispersion among top 5 executives and their turnover. He 
finds that abnormal pay dispersion is positively associated with executive turnover, which is driven by the result that 
low-ranked executives (ranked by total compensation) are more likely to leave the firm relative to high-ranked 
executives (ranked by total compensation) when abnormal pay dispersion is higher than the normal level. Taken 
together, these results are consistent with the notion that executive turnover is positively associated with 
disappointment about their compensation.  
 
2.3 Abnormal Pay Dispersion and Earnings Management 
 
When abnormal pay dispersion is high (low), low-ranked (highly-ranked) executives may seek a means to shift the 
pay distribution in their favor.  In both cases, executives likely feel that they are underpaid and that the only way to 
close the gap between what they are earning versus what they believe they should earn is to act opportunistically. 
One form of opportunistic behavior available to managers with performance-based pay is to manipulate reported 
earnings. When a firm reports upwardly-biased earnings, executives have a higher probability to receive bonus 
compensation and the value of their stock holdings increases.4  Healy (1985) suggests that bonus schemes provide 
incentives to manage earnings upward when earnings are between upper and lower boundaries of the bonus plans 
and incentives to manage earnings downward when earnings are over the upper limit or under the lower limit of the 
bonus plan.  
 
In addition to executive bonus plans, managers have incentives to meet-or-beat earnings benchmarks (MBE, 
hereafter) and smooth earnings via earnings management. Prior studies show that executives have compensation-
related incentives to MBE.  Matsunaga and Park (2001) find that missing quarterly analyst earnings forecasts 
reduces CEO annual bonus compensation. Mergenthaler et al. (2011) find that when a firm misses quarterly analyst 
forecasts, CEO and CFO equity grants and cash bonuses also decrease. Therefore executives who want to increase 
their total compensation are more likely to be engaged in upward earnings management for attaining bonus target or 
MBE. 
 
 On the other hand, reporting smooth earnings provides incentives to manage earnings downward since firms with 
low earnings volatility are benefited by higher market value (Trueman and Titman, 1988). Hence executives who 
want to maximize value of their stock holdings or equity compensation have incentives to manage earnings 
downward when their firm achieves much higher earnings than previous period.  Leone and Rock (2001) also 
provide evidence of management incentives for income-decreasing accruals management.  Following the above 
                                                
3 Byun (2014) suggests that low (high)-ranked executives are more likely to be dissatisfied with their pay level when pay dispersion is abnormally 
high (low). Because their relative compensation is lower than what they expect it to be. In all case, dissatisfied executives will not work hard and 
they are going to leave their company.  
4 If weights on firm performance for compensation purpose differ among the top executives, earnings management may mechanically create 
dispersion in pay.  However, we do not have information about weights for firm performance for each executive.  To address this simultaneity 
issue, we also use a one year ahead value for earnings management as a robustness check.  
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relation between earnings management and executive compensation, we suggest that abnormal pay dispersion is 
positively associated with earnings management.  We state our hypothesis below. 
 
Hypothesis: Absolute abnormal pay dispersion is positively associated with earnings management. 
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Data 
 
In this study, we examine the association between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management. For our 
analysis, we collect all executive specific information from ExecuComp dataset, which contains not merely 
compensation information but also executive title, tenure, and whether an executive is a member of board, etc. In 
addition, we extract financial statement data for firms from Compustat and stock return information from CRSP. 
Finally, data for corporate governance-related variables are obtained from the Risk Metrics dataset. The sample 
period runs from 1996 to 2009 because Risk Metrics coverage starts in 1996.  
 
We drop financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes 4400 – 4999 and 6000 - 6499) from our sample for two 
reasons; i) concern that government regulation may cause different pay structures for these firms, leading to 
differences in pay dispersion. ii) these firms have different incentives for earnings management and MBE.  So 
inclusion of these firms is likely to add noise in testing our hypotheses, especially for the relation between abnormal 
pay dispersion and earnings management. Our sample is limited to US companies because there may be a difference 
between US firms and foreign firms in compensation structures. Consistent with Byun (2014), we restrict our 
sample to firm-year observations with at least five executives and use the top 5 executives in our test.5 Hamm et al. 
(2011) report that some CEOs receive one dollar salary for several reasons. 6 We exclude these firms because they 
may cause noise in the estimation of expected level of pay dispersion 7 After, we apply these criteria and delete 
observations that do not contain all data items, we obtain a final sample of 9,105 firm-year observations to estimate 
normal pay dispersion level. 
 
3.2 Estimation of Normal Pay Dispersion Level 
 
 Following Byun (2014), we estimate the normal pay dispersion level for each firm-year observation using the 
regression model (1).  
 
PDt = α + β1* St_Tenuret + β2* St_Expt + β3* St_ROAt + β4* St_Rett + β5*St_HRespt + β6*St_Boardt  
+ β7*St_Holdt + β8*Dualt + β9*Sizet + β10*Segt + β11*Ch_Salet + β12*MTBt + β13*BSizet  
+ β14*BIndept + β15*BlockHoldert + β16*Fe_Ratiot + e t (1) 
Where: 
 
PD = Pay dispersion. The coefficient of variation (CV) of total compensation for top 5executives  
 
St_Tenure = CV of tenures for top 5 executives 
 
St_Exp = CV of previous experience dummy for top 5 executives; previous experience dummy is 1 
if an executive has previous work experience at other S&P 1500 firms as a top executive 
 
                                                
5 Byun (2014) argues that variation in the number of executives may mechanically affect pay dispersion in cases with more than five executives 
reported. Thus, we also use only top 5 highly paid executives in our test when a firm-year observation includes more than five executives in 
ExecuComp dataset.  
6 For example, Steve Jobs, a former CEO of Apple Inc., received only a single dollar salary for his total compensation although his internal power 
is enormous.  
7 We also exclude firms whose CEOs receive less than $1,000 for total compensation. 
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St_ROA = CV of industry mean-adjusted career ROA for top 5 executives 
 
St_Ret = CV of industry mean-adjusted career stock return for top 5 executives 
 
St_HResp = CV of dummies for executives who holds chairman, CEO, CFO and/or COO   
 
St_Board = CV of dummies for executives on the board among top 5 executives 
 
St_Hold = CV of stock holdings for top 5 executives 
 
Dual = 1 if the CEO has a chairman title; 0, otherwise 
 
Size = Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
Seg = Number of business segments 
 
Ch_Sale = Sales change from year t-1 to year t scaled by Sales in year t-1 
 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio 
 
BSize = Number of directors on the board 
 
BIndep = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
 
BlockHolder = Number of independent directors who own greater than 5 percent of the equity of the firm 
 
Fe_Ratio = Proportion of female executives among top five executives 
 
Our measure of pay dispersion (PD), which is dependent variable in equation (1), is the coefficient of variation 
(hereafter CV) of total compensation for top 5 executives. We calculate CV of total compensation as standard 
deviation of total compensation divided by mean total compensation for the top five executives. 8 Three types of 
variation in executive characteristics are included in our regression model because we expect that executive 
characteristics are likely to contribute to variation of pay dispersion between firms (Byun, 2014):  
 
(1)   Executive ability; Companies are more likely to set a different pay amount for each executive when 
variation in executive ability within a company is high. Thus, we expect pay dispersion to be high 
when the variation in CEO’s ability is high. We adopt industry mean-adjusted accounting performance 
(St_ROA) and stock price performance (St_Ret) as a proxy for executive ability. Following prior 
studies, we also include tenures (St_Tenure) and previous work experience of executive (St_Exp) as a 
proxy for executive ability (Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopa et al., 2006; Byun, 2014).  
(2)   Executive responsibility; Agarwal (1981) shows that variation in responsibility leads to variation in 
pay. Most executives in the top 5 ranks are greatly responsible for firm performance but some 
executives who are chairman, CEO, CFO, and/or COO have more responsibility than others 
(St_HResp). Board members are also more responsible for firm performance (St_Board). We expect 
that the variation in responsibility decreases when firm has more responsible executives in its top 5 
ranks.  
  
                                                
8 Byun (2014) picks CV as a measure of variation for two reasons. First, executive total compensation is positively associated with firm size. 
Because CV is a dispersion measure that can be interpreted in the context of the mean of total compensation, it allows comparison among 
dispersion levels for firms with different sizes. Second, using CV makes his findings comparable to prior studies’ findings (Rajgopal and 
Srinivasan, 2006; Lee et al., 2008).  
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(3)   Executive power; Prior studies report that ownership power is most likely related to pay dispersion. 
Executives with higher ownership generally hold more power because of higher capacity as an agent 
on behalf of shareholders (Finkelstein, 1992). Thus we include ownership which is measured by 
executive stock holding in the regression model (St_Hold). We also consider dual position power 
(Dual) as a CEO and a chairman because both CEO and chairman occupy the most main position in the 
company and they have higher influence in controlling compensation relative to other executives 
(Byun, 2014).  
 
In addition to three types of characteristics explained above, we include firm characteristics such as firm size, 
number of segments, and market to book ratio in the regression model following previous studies (Lee at al., 2008; 
Core et al., 1999; Ashbaugh et al., 2006; Byun et al., 2014). Finally, we contain year dummies and industry 
dummies in equation (1) to control for industry and year fixed effects. Fitted values from estimating equation (1) 
provide normal pay dispersion and residuals are abnormal pay dispersion, which is deviation from expected level of 
pay dispersion. Abnormal pay dispersion will be the variable of interest in subsequent analyses. 
 
3.3 Earnings Management 
 
To test the effect of abnormal pay dispersion on manager’s decision making about earnings management, we employ 
accruals management and real earnings management.  Following subsections explain measures of earnings 
management and models to test our hypothesis. 
 
3.3.1 Accruals Management 
 
We adopt the modified Jones model from Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995), controlling for contemporaneous 
ROA as suggested by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), to calculate discretionary accruals as our measure of 
earnings management. We calculate total accruals following Hribar and Collins (2002) using the cash flow 
statement approach.  The first stage model to estimate expected accruals level is as below. 
 
TA t / At-1 = α*[1 / At-1] + β1*[ΔREVt / At-1] + β2*[PPEt / At-1] + β3*ROAt + e t (2) 
 
Where: 
 
TA = Total accruals defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations 
 
A = Total assets 
 
ΔREV = Change in revenue from prior year 
 
PPE = Gross property, plant and equipment 
 
We run the above cross-sectional regression for each year by industry as defined by two-digit SIC code.  We 
exclude industry-years that contain fewer than 10 observations. We take the coefficient estimates from equation (2) 
and obtain the fitted values for each firm-year to obtain the expected accruals as shown in the equation below. 
 
NDA = αˆ *[1 / At-1] + βˆ 1*[(ΔREVt - ΔAR) / At-1] + βˆ 2*[PPEt / At-1] + βˆ 3*ROAt + e t (3) 
 
Where: 
 
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals 
 
ΔAR = Change in accounts receivable from prior year 
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We subtract the estimated expected accruals from the firm’s actual total accruals to find the discretionary accruals 
by firm. Positive (negative) discretionary accruals indicate upward (downward) earnings management. We use 
absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of accruals management because we expect abnormal pay 
dispersion provides incentives for both upward and downward earnings management. We estimate the following 
regression with potential factors that are likely to affect the decision to engage in earnings management to 
investigate the association between pay dispersion and accruals management 
 
Ab_DAt = α + β1*Ab_APDt + β2*NPDt + β3*Sizet + β4*MTBt + β5*Levt + β6*CEO_Equity_Ratiot  
+ β7*NOAt + β8*Litigationt + β9*Implicit_Claimt + β10*SOXt + e t (4) 
 
Where: 
 
Ab_DA  = Absoulte value of discretionary accruals calculated from modified Jones model 
 
Ab_APD  = Absolute value of abnormal pay dispersion defined as residual from estimating equation (1) 
 
NPD = Normal pay dispersion 
 
Size = Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio 
 
Lev = Leverage computed as total liability divided by total assets 
 
CEO_Equity_Ratio = CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation 
 
NOA = Net operating assets calculated as (shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities 
plus total debt) / sales 
 
Litigation = 1 if the firm is in one of the following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577,  
7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise 
 
Implicit_Claim = 1 minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets 
 
SOX = 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise 
 
The main coefficient of interest in equation (4) is β1. When deviation from normal level of dispersion provides 
incentives to manage earnings regardless of direction, β1 is expected to be positive. If one theory (tournament vs. 
pay equity) dominates, β1 is expected to be insignificant. Barton and Simko (2002) show that firms with already 
overstated assets have a lack of flexibility of managing earnings upward using accruals. We, therefore, include NOA 
in the regression but do not have a directional expectation. The coefficient on Litigation is expected to be positive 
because firms with high litigation risk may want to reduce potential litigation risk caused by upward earnings 
management. Implicit_Claim is expected to be negatively associated with DA because firms with high implicit 
claims are likely to choose long-run income-increasing accounting methods (Bowen et al. 1995), so we expect a 
positive coefficient. Following prior studies, we expect negative coefficients of SOX, but the coefficient can be 
positive if the magnitude of downward earnings management in which firms are engaged became larger after SOX. 
We also include CEO_Equity_Ratio to control for CEO individual incentives for earnings management. 
 
3.3.2 Real Earnings Management 
 
In addition to discretionary accruals, we also test our hypothesis adopting two real earnings management measures 
from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010) as further proxies for earnings management. We explain the 
measurement of two measures below. 
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3.4 Abnormal Expenses (R&D and SG&A Expense) 
 
After we estimate the following models to obtain normal level of R&D expense and SG&A expense respectively, 
we subtract the expected expenses from actual expenses. These become our measures of abnormal R&D expense 
and abnormal SG&A expense.  As our first measure for real earnings management, similar to our measure of 
discretionary accruals, we add these two abnormal expenses and take an absolute value. Therefore a higher absolute 
value of abnormal expense indicates a higher level of earnings management. We run the following regression for all 
firms in a given industry by year.   
 
RDt / At-1 = α0 + α1*[1 / At-1] + β1*MVt + β2*Qt + β3*[INTt-1 / At-1] + β4*[RDt-1 / At-1] + e t (5) 
 
SGAt / At-1 = α0 + α1*[1 / At-1] + β1*MVt + β2*Qt + β3*[INTt-1 / At-1] + β4*[ΔSt-1 / At-1]  
 
+ β5*[ΔSt-1 / At-1]*DD + e t (6) 
 
Where: 
 
RD = R&D Expense 
 
SGA = SG&A expense 
 
MV = The natural log of market value 
 
Q = Tobin’s Q calculated as [market value of equity + preferred stock carrying value + long-term debt 
+ debt in current liabilities] / total assets 
 
INT = Internal funds calculated as (income before extraordinary item + R&D expense + depreciation and 
amortization) 
 
ΔS = Change of total sales 
 
3.5 Abnormal Production Level 
 
Similar to our estimation of normal R&D expense and normal SG&A expense, we estimate the normal level of 
production and then subtract the normal level from the actual level. The difference between the normal level and the 
actual level of production is the abnormal production level. A higher absolute value of abnormal production 
indicates a higher level of earnings management.  
 
PRODt / At-1 = α0 + α1*[1 / At-1] + β1*MVt + β2*Qt + β3*[St / At-1] + β4*[ΔSt / At-1] + β5*[ΔSt-1 / At-1] + e t (7) 
 
Where: 
 
PROD = COGS plus change in inventory 
 
S = Total sales 
 
We run the following regression to test the hypothesis, which examines the relation between abnormal pay 
dispersion and earnings management. Except for coefficients of NOA and SOX, our expectations about the 
directions of all coefficients are same as for equation (4). If firms want to manage earnings upward when they are no 
longer able to manipulate accruals, they may convert to real activity management. Therefore we do not have a 
directional prediction on NOA.9 We expect a positive relation between real earnings management and SOX since 
                                                
9 Both Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find positive association between SOX and REM. 
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prior studies show such an association.  In testing our hypothesis, we expect a positive coefficient of β1for both 
absolute value of abnormal expense and abnormal production. 
  
Ab_REMt = α + β1*Abs_APDt + β2*NPDt + β3*Sizet + β4*MTBt + β5*Levt + β6*CEO_Equity_Ratiot  
+ β7*NOAt + β8*Litigationt + β9*Implicit_Claimt + β10*SOXt + e t (8)  
 
Where: 
 
Ab_REM = Absolute value of each real earnings management measure 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 describes distribution of abnormal pay dispersion (APD) and absolute value of abnormal pay dispersion 
(Ab_APD) and descriptive statistics for other variables used in this study. By construction, the mean of APD is zero. 
More importantly, APD and AB_APD show considerable variation within the sample. Untabulated result indicates 
that about 55.6% of sample firm-years have lower pay dispersion than expected. The mean and median of 
discretionary accruals (Ab_DA) are 0.056 and 0.041 respectively. The average Ab_PREM (Ab_EREM) as a proxy 
for real earnings management is 0.233(0.237). The average of MTB ratio is 3.968. On average, CEO receives equity 
compensation that is 43% of total compensation in our sample. 
 
Table 1. Description of Abnormal Pay Dispersion and Main Variables 
 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
APD -0.000 -0.030 0.254 -0.165 0.122 
Ab_APD 0.191 0.148 0.167 0.068 0.265 
Ab_DA 0.056 0.041 0.053 0.019 0.077 
Ab_PREM 0.233 0.149 0.281 0.065 0.283 
Ab_EREM 0.237 0.141 0.329 0.058 0.281 
Size 7.410 7.286 1.415 6.416 8.287 
MTB 3.968 2.377 3.163 1.582 3.829 
Lev 0.217 0.211 0.171 0.071 0.324 
CEO_Equity_Ratio 0.431 0.459 0.281 0.217 0.651 
NOA 0.663 0.532 0.713 0.344 0.784 
Litigation 0.346 0 0.476 0 1 
Implicit_Claim 0.448 0.533 0.366 0.247 0.729 
SOX 0.477 0 0.499 0 1 
APD is residual from equation (1).  Ab_APD is absolute value of APD. Ab_DA is absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from 
modified Jones model.  Ab_PREM is absolute value of abnormal production calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010).  
Ab_EREM is absolute value of sum of abnormal R&D expense and abnormal SG&A expense calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny 
(2010). Size is natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is market-to-book ratio. Lev is leverage computed as total liability divided by total assets. 
CEO_Equity_Ratio is CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation.  NOA is net operating assets calculated as (shareholders’ 
equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt) / sales.  Litigation is 1 if the firm is in one of the following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 
8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise.  Implicit_Claim is proxied by labor intensity calculated as 1 minus the 
ratio of gross PPE to total assets. SOX is 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise. 
 
4.2 Testing Hypotheses 
 
Table 2 and 3 present the results of testing the association between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings 
management. Table 2 reports the results for discretionary accruals. The coefficient on Ab_APD is positive and 
significant as expected. This provides support for our hypothesis that abnormal pay dispersion is positively 
associated with earnings management.10 Change in Ab_APD from the first quartile to the third quartile increases 
discretionary accruals by 0.12% of total assets. This increase is about 2% of the sample mean discretionary accruals 
                                                
10 We include raw pay dispersion in the equation (4) to check whether our result still holds even after controlling raw pay dispersion. Untabulated 
result shows positive coefficient on Ab_APD and negative coefficient on raw pay dispersion, which confirms that our result is robust. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 696 The Clute Institute 
of 5.6%. Most control variables show the expected signs. Table 3 provides the estimation results of regression (8) 
for real earnings management. The coefficients on Ab_APD are significantly positive for both real earnings 
management measures, consistent with accruals management. Coefficients on most control variables show the 
expected directions as indicated previously.  
 
Table 2. Effect of Abnormal Pay dispersion on Accruals Management 
Include Equation (4) 
Dep = Ab_DAt 
Intercept 0.053*** (0.005) 
Ab_APD 0.006** (0.003) 
NPD 0.041*** (0.008) 
Size -0.005*** (0.001) 
MTB 0.002*** (0.000) 
Lev -0.017*** (0.004) 
CEO_Equity_Ratio 0.013*** (0.002) 
NOA 0.002* (0.001) 
Litigation 0.003*** (0.001) 
Implicit_Claim 0.005*** (0.002) 
SOX 0.002* (0.001) 
Sample Size 8,674 
Adj. R-sq 0.0450 
Ab_DA is absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from modified Jones model. Ab_APD is absolute value of Abnormal. NPD is 
normal pay dispersion for top 5 executives.  Size is natural logarithm of total assets.  MTB is market-to-book ratio.  Lev is leverage computed as 
total liability divided by total assets.  CEO_Equity_Ratio is CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation.  NOA is net operating 
assets calculated as (shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt) / sales.  Litigation is 1 if the firm is in one of the 
following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise.  Implicit_Claim is proxied by labor 
intensity calculated as 1 minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets.  SOX is 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed test, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Overall, results for accruals management are consistent with our expectations. To confirm the relation between 
abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management, we test the effect of abnormal pay dispersion on directional 
earnings management in subsamples where firms are considered to be more likely engaged in upward earnings 
management (untabulated). For example, we re-estimate equation (4) by replacing dependent variables with 
directional earnings management measures in subsamples where firms meet or just beat analyst forecasts, prior 
year’s earnings, or zero earnings. However, the results do not support the expectation that abnormal pay dispersion 
increases upward earnings management. Therefore, we leave the relation between abnormal pay dispersion and 
directional earnings management as a future research question.  
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 697 The Clute Institute 
Table 3. Effect of Abnormal Pay dispersion on Real Earnings Management 
Include Equation (8) 
 Dep = Ab_PREM Dep = Ab_EREM 
Intercept 
0.219*** 0.025 
(0.028) (0.043) 
Ab_APD 
0.043** 0.082** 
(0.020) (0.032) 
NPD 
-0.082* 0.021 
(0.046) (0.073) 
Size 
-0.002 0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
MTB 
0.005*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Lev 
0.013 -0.104*** 
(0.023) (0.030) 
CEO_Equity_Ratio 
0.000 -0.018 
(0.012) (0.020) 
NOA 
-0.048*** 0.034** 
(0.007) (0.014) 
Litigation 
0.020*** 0.056*** 
(0.007) (0.009) 
Implicit_Claims 
0.125*** 0.120*** 
(0.009) (0.015) 
SOX 
0.038*** -0.026*** 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Sample Size 7,920 5,260 
Adj. R-sq 0.047 0.041 
Ab_PREM is absolute value of abnormal production calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010).  Ab_EREM is absolute value of 
sum of abnormal R&D expense and abnormal SG&A expense calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010).  Ab_APD is absolute 
value of APD. Size is natural logarithm of total assets.  NPD is normal pay dispersion for top 5 executives.  MTB is market-to-book ratio.  Lev is 
leverage computed as total liability divided by total assets.  CEO_Equity_Ratio is CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation.  
NOA is net operating assets calculated as (shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt) / sales.  Litigation is 1 if the 
firm is in one of the following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise.  Implicit_Claim 
is proxied by labor intensity calculated as 1 minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets. SOX is 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise.  ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed test, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses are standard 
errors. 
 
4.3 Robustness Check  
 
To relieve a concern that the results about earnings management are affected by reverse causality, we include only 
salary in estimating abnormal pay dispersion. Since executives are presumed to know their relative salary level at 
the beginning of the period, examining relation between abnormal salary dispersion and contemporaneous earnings 
management is free from issue about reverse causal direction. Hence we revisit our hypotheses by using only salary 
in determinants model. Table 4 provides results for abnormal salary dispersion effect on earnings management. By 
using only salary in estimating abnormal pay dispersion, the relation between abnormal salary dispersion and 
earnings management confirms the main results. As another robustness check for simultaneity issue, we also use a 
one year ahead value for earnings management as a robustness check. Untabulated results show qualitatively similar 
results. 
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Table 4. Robustness check with using only salary instead of total compensation 
 
Accruals Management Real Earnings Management 
Dep = Ab_DAt Dep = Ab_PREMt Dep = Ab_EREMt 
Intercept 
0.075*** 0.398*** 0.353*** 
(0.004) (0.036) (0.052) 
Ab_APD 
0.011* 0.029 0.030 
(0.006) (0.038) (0.053) 
NPD 
-0.017 -0.538*** -0.799*** 
(0.012) (0.072) (0.104) 
Size 
-0.004*** -0.000 0.020*** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
MTB 
0.002*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lev 
-0.016*** 0.024 -0.073** 
(0.004) (0.023) (0.030) 
CEO_Equity_Ratio 
0.015*** 0.000 -0.019 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.019) 
NOA 
0.002* -0.050*** 0.029** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.014) 
Litigation 
0.003** 0.016** 0.041*** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.009) 
Implicit_Claim 
0.006*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.015) 
SOX 
0.002* 0.034*** -0.035*** 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
Sample Size 8,674 7,920 5,260 
Adj. R-sq 0.042 0.053 0.049 
Ab_DA is absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from modified Jones model. Ab_PREM is absolute value of abnormal production 
calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010). Ab_EREM is absolute value of sum of abnormal R&D expense and abnormal SG&A 
expense calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010). Ab_APD is absolute value of Abnormal. NPD is normal pay dispersion for 
top 5 executives. Size is natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is market-to-book ratio. Lev is leverage computed as total liability divided by total 
assets. CEO_Equity_Ratio is CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation.  NOA is net operating assets calculated as 
(shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt) / sales.  Litigation is 1 if the firm is in one of the following SIC codes: 
2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise.  Implicit_Claim is proxied by labor intensity calculated as 1 
minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets.  SOX is 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed test, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
As a further sensitivity check, we employ accruals quality measure from the Dechow-Dichev model as modified by 
Francis et al. (2005) to test abnormal pay dispersion effect on accruals management. The Dechow-Dichev model 
focuses on the relation between current accruals and past, present, and future cash flows. Furthermore, Francis et al. 
(2005) include the change in revenue and property, plant, and equipment in the Dechow-Dichev model. The results 
also confirm the positive association between abnormal pay dispersion and accruals management by showing that 
the higher absolute value of abnormal pay dispersion leads to the lower earnings quality. 
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Table 5. Robustness Check with Using Francis et al. (2005) model. 
 Dep = Ab_DDt 
Intercept 0.063*** (0.003) 
Ab_APD 0.019*** (0.003) 
NPD -0.006*** (0.002) 
Size -0.005*** (0.001) 
MTB 0.001*** (0.000) 
Lev 0.009** (0.004) 
CEO_Equity_Ratio 0.013*** (0.002) 
NOA 0.002** (0.001) 
Litigation 0.004*** (0.001) 
Implicit_Claim 0.006*** (0.002) 
SOX 0.001 (0.001) 
Sample Size 8,297 
Adj. R-sq 0.0352 
Ab_DD is absolute value of accruals quality calculated from the model in Francis et al. (2005). Ab_APD is absolute value of Abnormal. NPD is 
normal pay dispersion for top 5 executives. Size is natural logarithm of total assets.  MTB is market-to-book ratio.  Lev is leverage computed as 
total liability divided by total assets.  CEO_Equity_Ratio is CEO equity compensation scaled by CEO total compensation.  NOA is net operating 
assets calculated as (shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt) / sales.  Litigation is 1 if the firm is in one of the 
following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961; 0, otherwise.  Implicit_Claim is proxied by labor 
intensity calculated as 1 minus the ratio of gross PPE to total assets.  SOX is 1 if the year is after 2003; 0 otherwise.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed test, respectively. Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Some firm-year observations in ExecuComp database contain valid information for fewer than five executives. 
Limiting our sample to firm-years with five executives may lose a lot of observations and affect our results. To 
avoid this issue, we restrict our sample to firm-years with at least three executives and retest analysis (untabulated). 
Results are qualitatively similar. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Prior studies document that pay dispersion among top executives affects firm performance and executive turnover 
based on tournament theory and pay equity theory. We expect that abnormal pay dispersion among top executives 
affects financial reporting practice as well as firm performance and turnover and provide evidence of positive 
association between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management. Findings of this study contribute to the 
accounting literature by reporting that abnormal pay dispersion may increase agency costs by providing incentives 
for rent-seeking behavior and shed a light on the importance of setting appropriate relative compensation level 
among executives. Finally, this study suggests the examination of association between abnormal pay dispersion and 
directional earnings management as a further step in research about abnormal pay dispersion. It could be interesting 
to explore in which circumstances abnormal pay dispersion influences upward or downward earnings management.   
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